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Abstract 
Repositioning by political elites plays a key role in a variety of political phenomena, including 
legislative policymaking and campaigning. While previous studies suggest that repositioning will lead 
to negative evaluations, these studies have not explored the role of elite communications in structuring 
mass responses. We argue that this omission is problematic because elite explanations for their actions 
may limit the costs associated with 'flip-flopping' by persuading some citizens to update their attitudes 
so that they agree with the elite's new stance and also by molding beliefs about the motives of the elite 
when repositioning. We present evidence supportive of this argument obtained from two large 
experiments conducted on samples of American adults. Ultimately, we show that elites offering a 
satisfactory justification for their change can avoid most, if not all, of the evaluative costs that would 
otherwise occur. This study thus has important implications not just for this particular element of elite 
behavior, but also related questions concerning governmental accountability and representation. 
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Repositioning by elected officials and candidates is an important element of democratic politics. 
Policy switches underlie both spatial models and empirical patterns of party competition (Downs 1957; 
Karol 2009; Tomz and Van Houweling 2008).2 Policy switches also play a key, if contested, role in 
                                                          
 
2 Data and all replication code for the analyess presented herein can be found at the Political Behavior Dataverse.   
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accounts of governmental accountability and responsiveness (Stokes 1999). Repositioning features 
prominently in electoral campaigns in the form of charges of ‘flip-flopping’.3 These accusations, in 
turn, have important implications for policymaking insofar as they constrain elected officials from 
changing positions to compromise and thereby fan the flames of elite polarization and gridlock (Fenno 
1986; Tomz and Van Houweling 2012b). Understanding repositioning is thus a critical subject of 
inquiry for those interested in the broader functioning of representative democracies. 
Previous studies concerning the potential electoral consequences of repositioning primarily 
suggest that policy switches will lead to worse evaluations of the elite in question (e.g. Hoffman and 
Carver 1984; Sigelman and Sigelman 1986; Tomz and Van Houweling 2012a). We may then expect 
that rational legislators concerned with re-election would be hesitant to switch positions. However, 
empirical investigations of position change among elites actually show a good deal of repositioning 
occurring (Espino and Canon 2009; Karol 2009). There thus seems to be a potential discord between 
the actual behavior of legislators and what we might expect given the existing literature on the 
evaluative consequences of repositioning. How can we understand this apparent deviation?  
There are certainly multiple reasons why repositioning may not have the negative consequences 
existing work suggests it should, thereby freeing rational legislators to change positions. For instance, 
work by Doherty et al. (n.d.), Croco (n.d.), and Van Houweling and Tomz (2012a) suggests that a 
constituency overwhelmingly in favor of a position on a highly salient issue would scarcely punish a 
repositioning elite that adopts the modal position of the constituency. Meanwhile, not all policy 
switches will be made public thereby limiting the ability of citizens to punish the elite for their change. 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that ‘flip-flops’ in popular parlance often refer to cases where elites switch back and forth on an issue 
multiple times, while our current investigation focuses on a single switch (as does existing work on this subject; e.g. Croco 
n.d.; Doherty, Dowling, and Miller n.d.; Hoffman and Carver 1984; Tomz and Van Houweling 2012a). As we discuss in the 
conclusion, the number of switches is an important area for future work on this subject.  
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Our focus is on an element of repositioning that has not received much empirical attention: the role of 
communications. In cases where a policy switch does earn public attention and the threat of electoral 
harm grows, repositioning elites are likely to have the opportunity to explain their decision and attempt 
to frame the switch in a positive light. Our central question is whether such explanations can play a role 
in limiting the potential negative consequences of repositioning.  
We argue that explanations can indeed play a role in explaining the reaction of citizens to 
repositioning. In particular, explanations may limit the negative consequences of repositioning for at 
least two reasons. First, they may persuade some individuals that the new position of the legislator is 
the better one (e.g. McGraw 1991), thereby limiting proximity-related costs. Second, explanations may 
also target beliefs about the motives for the change in position, thereby limiting costs since individuals 
may grant decision makers leeway when they are perceived as positively motivated (see: Tyler 2011). 
Over the course of two experiments conducted on large samples of American adults we find that (1) 
repositioning without an explanation does lead to evaluative costs and (2) providing an explanation for 
the switch mitigates these costs. In the aggregate our results suggest that explanation giving may 
primarily work through persuasion, i.e. by reducing proximity costs. Ultimately, this study suggests 
that political elites may have more room for electorally-safe compromise than the conventional wisdom 
might allow. 
Is Being a “Flip-Flopper” Such a Bad Thing? 
Assessing the electoral consequences of repositioning can be difficult given that repositioning 
may be strategic in nature and because other aspects of the political environment may also be affecting 
elite evaluations. For this reason, the most precise causal estimates for the effects of repositioning stem 
from studies that utilize an experimental design wherein various aspects of the elite are held constant 
but policy consistency is randomly varied (Allgeier et al. 1979; Carlson and Dolan 1985; Croco and 
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Gartner 2014; Doherty et al. n.d.; Hoffman and Carver 1984; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; 
Sigelman and Sigelman 1986; Tomz and Van Houweling 2012a, 2012b). The modal finding of these 
studies is that an elite who has changed positions is evaluated significantly worse than one who has 
remained consistent. Interestingly, prior work shows that repositioning tends to have negative 
evaluative consequences both among those who lost and gained proximity from the change, albeit to a 
larger extent among the former group (e.g. Doherty, Dowling, and Miller n.d.; Hoffman and Carver 
1984). Repositioning thus appears to harm evaluations for two reasons: (1) for instrumental reasons 
having to do with proximity and (2) because individuals may prefer consistency insofar as it can be 
used as a cue for making easy inferences regarding the future trustworthiness of the elite (Kartik and 
McAfee 2007; Tomz and Van Houweling 2012b). 
Existing work suggests that repositioning will negatively affect elite evaluations, which may 
motivate elites to remain consistent instead of risking a loss of votes due to policy switching. This 
supposition is consistent with the literature on issue evolution which argues that elites will be 
consistent in the positions they take and thus that parties will change position on an issue gradually due 
to member replacement (e.g. Carmines and Stimson 1989; Wolbrecht 2000). However, Karol (2009) 
convincingly demonstrates that member conversion, i.e. policy switches, frequently drives party 
position change in the United States. Indeed, his analyses demonstrate that it is not uncommon to see 
policy switches by legislators that are both rapid in nature and also unstable, with many members of a 
party switching from one side of an issue to the other and then fairly quickly changing back. If negative 
evaluations always followed from repositioning, or even just most of the time, then it is unclear why 
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rational legislators would engage in such behavior. This discord between the two literatures suggests 
investigating in further detail the potential limits on the negative consequences of repositioning.4  
 
Justifying Repositioning 
To better understand repositioning we suggest investigating the efforts made by elites to explain 
their behavior when switches become public. Elites are generally sensitive to the need to explain 
themselves to constituents and are more likely to take an action when they believe they have an 
explanation that will assuage potential concerns among the public (Bianco 1994; Fenno 1978). 
Notably, explanations feature prominently in many cases of repositioning as several examples 
demonstrate. John Kerry was infamously hampered in 2004 by a poor explanation for vote switching 
("I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted against it."; Roselli 2004). Hillary Clinton has 
attempted to recast her policy switches as emanating from “new information” (Cillizza 2015) while 
Mitt Romney often described his changes as “heart-felt changes of opinion” (Babington 2011). And 
Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) justified his decision to change position on same-sex marriage by 
appealing to Biblical values of equality (Cirilli 2013). The thinking behind these examples can be best 
summarized in the following quote by a Democratic strategist: “There are levels of flip-flops….As long 
as you can explain what you are doing and why, [repositioning is] fine” (Sullivan and Johnson 2015).  
If explanations mollify constituents when a policy switch becomes public, then this suggests one 
plausible reason why legislators engage in the behavior despite the risk of vote losses: a confidence in 
                                                          
4 There also exists a literature on the effects of repositioning by European political parties. The effects of such changes on 
voting behavior appear to be highly contingent in nature and may only show up over extended periods of time (Adams, 
Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011, 2014; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Tavits 2007). 
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their ability to explain the action.5 However, prior work on policy switches has not explored whether 
such explanations affect the consequences of repositioning on evaluations.6  
Existing work from contexts other than repositioning strongly suggests that explanation giving 
can indeed be a powerful blame management tool (Broockman and Butler n.d.; Chanley et al. 1994; 
Grose, Malhotra, and Van Houweling 2015; McGraw 1991; McGraw, Best, and Timpone 1995; 
McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1993). There are two general, and interrelated, caveats to this claim. 
First, much as with persuasive messages more generally (e.g. Zaller 1992), explanations only work to 
the extent that they are accepted or held to be satisfactory. Second, some types of explanation are more 
likely than others to be accepted (McGraw 1990, 1991). Justifications, as opposed to excuses or 
denials, tend to do particularly well on this front. When offering a justification, the elite accepts 
responsibility for the decision but attempts to reframe it in a new and more positive light; Yes I did X, 
but I did it because of Y (where Y could be an appeal to shared norms and values or the potential 
instrumental benefits of the action). We focus on this type of explanation.   
Prior work on explanation giving suggests one reason for expecting justifications to mitigate the 
costs of repositioning: persuasion. Elites who offer a justification for a switch provide reasons for 
preferring the new position to the old. Strategic elites may thus be able to take advantage of the 
relatively weak attitudes of many citizens on public policy to prompt a re-evaluation of the policy to 
the favor of the elite’s new stance (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). Indeed, McGraw (1991) shows that 
                                                          
5 Of course, it is possible that explanations play this role even without affecting the mass public. In other words, legislators 
may switch positions when they think they can explain the switch even if explanations don’t generally work.  
6 One potential exception is Levendusky and Horowitz (2012), who investigate a particular context: a President who backs 
down from a commitment to enter a foreign conflict. Study participants evaluated the fictional President worse than a 
consistent one unless the inconsistent President indicated that they changed course due to the presence of new information. 
This should provide added confidence to the importance of explanations. However, people treat legislators and executives 
differently (Sigelman et al.1992). Presidents are also given greater leeway for foreign affairs than other issues (Sirin and 
Villalobos 2011). Presidents may be a highly credible source on that particular issue; it is unclear whether similar effects 
will emerge elsewhere. The present study thus builds on Levendusky and Horowitz (2012). 
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satisfactory justifications change policy evaluations, while Broockman and Butler (n.d.) demonstrate 
that this may occur even when the justification is rather bare-bones in nature. As we noted earlier, 
repositioning tends to have a larger negative effect among those who disagree with the elite’s new 
position (i.e. those who lose proximity). Justifications may thus work by pulling some audience 
members closer to the elite’s new position, thereby limiting proximity based punishments.  
Providing a justification for repositioning may work in a second way. Individuals are not only 
concerned with the instrumental outcomes of elite decisions. Rather, individuals are also deeply 
concerned with the process by which such decisions are reached (Bøggild and Petersen 2016; Hibbing 
and Alford 2004; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Ramirez 2008). Importantly, individuals are more 
likely to accept a decision they do not agree with when they believe it was reached via fair procedures 
(Gangl 2003; Tyler 2011; Tyler and Blader 2003). A particularly crucial element of procedural fairness 
judgments concerns the motive attributions made by individuals regarding the decision maker; 
individuals are particularly likely to judge procedures fair, and accept resulting decisions, when they 
perceive that the decision maker was motivated by positively valenced motives (Tyler and Degoey 
1996). In the political arena, such motives include a desire to make good public policy, represent 
constituents, and advance common values, while negatively valenced motives include political self-
interest (Doherty 2015). Notably, justifications are also likely to target these beliefs. By highlighting 
particular ends the elite signals the goals they deem important and, hence, the motives behind their 
actions. Thus, providing a justification may also remedy the costs of repositioning by prompting 
audience members to believe that positively valenced motives underlie the change in position.  
Based on the foregoing, we formally postulate the following hypotheses:  
H1: Elites who change their position on an issue without an explanation will be rated 
more negatively than those who are consistent, all else equal 
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H2: Justifications will mitigate the negative evaluations of repositioning, all else 
equal, 
 
H3: Justifications will lead to more positive evaluations of the elite’s final policy, all 
else equal  
 
H4: Justifications will be associated with beliefs that the policy switch was motivated 
by positively valenced goals, all else equal 
 
Experimental Design 
We fielded two experiments to investigate the role of justifications in understanding 
repositioning. In both experiments subjects were exposed to a vignette wherein a political elite was 
randomly portrayed as either consistent or not on an issue and, in the latter case, to provide a 
justification or not. The first experiment was conducted in June 2014 with a sample of 1550 American 
adults recruited from Survey Sampling International’s (SSI) national panel of survey respondents. The 
sample is broadly representative of the American mass public in terms of its demographic and political 
characteristics, although better educated and with a Democratic tilt. The second experiment, 
meanwhile, was conducted in June 2015 with a total of 1078 subjects. Study participants were a 
convenience sample recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. While such 
samples, including our own, tend to be younger, better educated, and more liberal than the mass public 
as a whole, validation exercises suggest that MTurk samples generate results comparable to studies 
using other sampling methods (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Mullinix et al. 2015). Moreover, we 
did not have a priori reasons to expect these variables to moderate our hypotheses (Druckman and Kam 
2011). We provide summary statistics for both samples in Online Appendix A.7 Meanwhile, in Online 
Appendix D we provide results showing that our analyses are robust to the inclusion of demographic 
                                                          
7 Online Appendix A also provides results from randomization checks for both experiments (in both cases, our included 
predictors were jointly insignificant i.e. conditions were balanced); results from manipulation checks; details on the 
measurement of the variables used in our analyses; summary statistics for both of our dependent variables by treatment 
condition; and results from a pre-test for the explanations used in Study 1.  
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variables and that age, education, and partisanship/ideology do not meaningfully moderate the 
relationships shown in subsequent sections.  
Study 1: Repositioning by a Candidate 
Participants in Study 1 read about an anonymous candidate for office (Candidate A) and their 
position history on the Dream Act, a piece of legislation concerning immigration policy in the United 
States. No identifying information was offered about Candidate A to isolate the effects of repositioning 
itself (see also: Tomz and Van Houweling 2012a). Participants then answered a series of evaluative 
measures about the candidate before recording their own issue attitude and answering a battery of 
demographic and political measures to conclude the survey.  
The position history and presence/type of justification associated with Candidate A was 
randomly assigned across participants; treatment wordings are contained in Table 1. There were four 
variants of the position history treatment: Consistent Support (e.g. Support, Support), Consistent 
Opposition, and two repositioning variants (Support/Oppose and Oppose/Support). The presence and 
type of justification was also randomly varied. Candidate A either provided no justification for the 
switch, one rooted in norms of societal fairness, or one where Candidate A compared the potential 
positive and negative policy outcomes associated with passing the bill.8  
[Insert Table 1 Around Here] 
Study 2: Repositioning by a Congressperson 
                                                          
8 Also included in the design, but omitted from analyses in-text, are separate conditions wherein Candidate A was consistent 
and provided an explanation for the position they consistently took. Given that our interest is in comparing repositioning 
sans justifications and repositioning with them, we will not investigate these conditions in-text. The consistent version of 
Candidate A explored in text is one that does not offer a justification for their position taking. Our conclusions would be the 
same if the consistent/justification sub-sample were also included; see Appendix OB for a replication of in-text analyses 
with this subsample included. Given that the mean values on our DVs tend to be slightly lower among those who also 
received a justification from the consistent candidate, omitting this subsample biases against supporting our hypotheses.  
10 
 
 We fielded a second experiment to add confidence to the generalizability of the first study’s 
results. The experimental vignette in the second experiment focuses on a different type of elite, a 
different issue, uses different justifications, and was conducted at a different point in time. The vignette 
also included much more contextual information about the elite in question, including the elite’s 
partisanship. Finally, we included a baseline condition in which the elite’s position history (consistent 
or otherwise) is not mentioned. The inclusion of this condition enables us to estimate whether 
respondents are penalizing repositioning and/or rewarding consistency. Ultimately, if results similar to 
Study 1 emerge in this very different experimental context, then we can be even more confident in the 
influence of justifications on evaluations in policy switching contexts.  
All respondents in Study 2 read a vignette concerning a member of the House of 
Representatives; see Table 1 for treatment wordings. The vignettes provided identical background 
information on the Representative save for two aspects that were randomly varied. First, for half the 
sample the Representative was a Democrat while the other half read about a Republican. Second, the 
position history of the Representative on a specific bill, a real patent reform bill titled the TROL Act, 
was also randomly assigned. A Baseline condition received no information on this topic, a Consistent 
Representative condition was told that the Representative had been accused of repositioning but that a 
PolitiFact investigation had cleared the Representative, and the final three versions indicated that this 
accusation had merit. The Representative offered a justification for their switch in two of these three 
Repositioned Representative conditions, one focused on the motivating presence of new information 
and the other an appeal to the personal conscience of the elite. As a final point here, it should be noted 
that the specific position of the Representative is never mentioned in the vignette. Thus, if providing a 
justification does mitigate the costs of repositioning, we can have added confidence that they do so for 
reasons beyond persuasion as there is no position here for the elite to persuade the audience to adopt.  
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Key Variables 
 Respondents to both studies were asked to answer a feeling thermometer and a battery of trait 
items regarding the elite. In Study 1, respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they 
agreed/disagreed that Candidate A was honest, intelligent, a strong leader, open-minded, and 
compassionate, while in Study 2 they were presented with the intelligent, open-minded, and strong-
leader trait items. In both studies the thermometer and trait items load onto a single dimension via 
factor analysis; our core dependent variable is this factor variable (M = 0, SD = 1).9   
 To assess the potential persuasive influence of the justifications, all respondents in Study 1 were 
asked on the post-test to record their attitude toward the Dream Act on a 7-point scale from strongly 
oppose to strongly support (M=3.96 [95% CI: 3.86, 4.05]), although for the analyses below we have 
rescaled the variable from -3 to 3, with responses greater than 0 indicating support for the Dream Act. 
All respondents in Study 1, and those receiving a justification in Study 2, were also asked about the 
motives of the elite. In Study 1, respondents were asked to indicate how important five motives were 
for why Candidate A took their final position. Responses to these five questions load onto two 
dimensions via a factor analysis (as in Doherty 2015): Representation Motives (to help all Americans; 
to help constituents) and Political Motives (to pander to voters; increase political influence; win 
office/re-election). Meanwhile, participants in Study 2 were asked to rate the importance of 9 motives 
for why Representative A changed positions, with three dimensions emerging: Representation Motives 
(help all Americans; help constituents; make good policy), the Policy Motives of the representative 
(ideological reasons; own policy preferences; own personal values), and Political Motives (winning re-
                                                          
9 In Study 1, this single factor has an eigenvalue of 3.76 and explains 62.6% of the variance among the items; factor 
loadings of the individual items ranges from a low of 0.74 (thermometer) to a high of 0.83 (strong leadership). In Study 2, 
the single dimension has an eigenvalue of 2.59 and explains 64.8% of the variance across the items; factor loadings range 
from a low of 0.76 (open-minded) to a high of 0.84 (feeling thermometer). In Online Appendix B we provide replications of 
our results focused on the individual items of this scale (see Tables OB11-12).  
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election; pandering to voters; influence of special interests). Higher scores on each dimension indicate 
a greater perceived importance for the type of motive in accounting for the elite’s behavior. 
Results 
 
We divide our analyses as follows. We first discuss the influence of repositioning when no 
justification is provided, before exploring the role of justification provision. In so doing we examine 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 which state that a policy switch sans explanation will harm elite evaluations, while 
the provision of a justification will mitigate these costs. We conclude by examining Hypothesis 3 
(justifications persuade) and Hypothesis 4 (justifications lead to more positive motive attributions). Our 
analyses will focus on comparisons of mean evaluations by treatment vignette given random 
assignment.10  
Does Repositioning Without an Explanation Hurt Evaluations?  
 We begin with Figure 1 where we plot the mean rating given to the elite in both studies by 
experimental condition (top set of subgraphs) as well as the difference in evaluations between those 
reading about a repositioning elite and those reading either the Consistent (Study 1) or Baseline (Study 
2) vignette (middle set of subgraphs). The evidence in Figure 1 is consistent with H1 (repositioning 
leads to evaluative costs) in both studies. In Study 1, Candidate A was evaluated -0.30 [95% CI: -0.49, 
-0.11] standard deviations worse when repositioning then when consistent. Likewise, the repositioning 
representative in Study 2 was evaluated worse than the baseline representative by -0.40 [-0.58, -0.22] 
standard deviations. Figure 1 also shows that the mere allegation of repositioning can carry costs as 
seen in the evaluation of the consistent candidate in Study 2. Recall that the experimental vignette in 
this condition indicated that allegations of repositioning had been raised but that they lacked merit. This 
                                                          
10 These analyses are robust to alternative specifications including analyses with demographic and political control variables 
(see Online Appendices B & D).  
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version of the representative was nevertheless evaluated significantly worse than the baseline version 
(difference: -0.28 [-0.45, -0.10]). Ultimately, the clear takeaway from Figure 1 is that repositioning 
without an explanation is a costly endeavor.  
[Insert Figure 1 Around Here] 
Does Offering a Justification Mitigate the Evaluative Harm of Repositioning?   
Repositioning without a justification incurred evaluative costs, but can providing a justification 
mitigate these costs as suggested by H2?  We return here to Figure 1 which also provides the difference 
in evaluations between those that read about a repositioning elite that did not offer a justification and 
evaluations made by those that also read a justification. Ultimately, Figure 1 strongly suggests that 
providing a justification can mitigate the costs of repositioning, although in both studies one of the 
justifications performed better than the other in so doing.  
In Study 1, Figure 1 shows that respondents in the Societal Fairness condition did not evaluate 
the candidate significantly worse than those in the Consistent Candidate condition (difference: -0.15 [-
0.34, 0.04]), with evaluations ultimately sitting somewhere in the middle between the Consistent and 
Repositioned (No Justification) conditions.  In other words, this justification appears to have cut the 
costs of repositioning in half on average.  On the other hand, the Comparison of Ends justification did 
not have as much success with evaluations remaining significantly worse than those given to the 
consistent candidate (difference: -0.26 [-0.44, -0.08]) and scarcely different from those offered in the 
No Justification condition (difference: 0.03 [-0.15, 0.22]). Intriguingly, the more effective Societal 
Fairness justification was rated as more satisfactory by respondents on the post-test than the 
Comparison of Ends justification, albeit not significantly so (difference: 0.12 [-0.17, 0.41]). Ultimately, 
Study 1 suggests that providing a justification can ameliorate the costs of repositioning, but it is not a 
sure bet.  
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 The results from Study 2 provide further support for Hypothesis 2. Respondents assigned to 
read the New Information justification did not evaluate the representative worse than those in the 
Baseline condition (difference: -0.04 [-0.22, 0.14]), while they did evaluate the representative 
substantially better than respondents reading about a repositioning representative that offered no 
explanation (difference: 0.36 [0.18, 0.54]). In other words, this account appears to have completely 
recouped the costs of repositioning. Meanwhile, the Personal Fairness justification also cut the costs of 
repositioning albeit not fully so. While respondents in this condition evaluated the representative better 
than those in the No Justification counterfactual (difference: 0.25 [0.07, 0.43]), repositioning still 
exacted some limited costs for the representative compared to the Baseline condition (difference: -0.15 
[-0.33, 0.03]). As with Study 1, the better performing justification was evaluated as more satisfactory 
on the post-test (difference: 0.34, [0.04, 0.63]). Together, the results from these two studies suggest that 
justification provision may play a role in explaining when the mass public will punish repositioning. 
Costs are particularly likely either when no account for the change is offered or perhaps when a poor 
one is employed.11  
Explaining Explanations: Persuasion  
 In the preceding discussion we have seen that justifications may, in the aggregate, recoup the 
evaluative costs of repositioning. How does providing a justification lead to this outcome? In H3 we 
suggest one possibility: persuasion. The justification may ameliorate the negative evaluative costs of 
repositioning by shifting some audience members in the direction of the elite’s new position and thus 
                                                          
11 One question of potential interest is how background characteristics of the audience influence reactions to repositioning 
both with and without a justification. Recent work on motivated reasoning, for instance, might suggest that individuals 
likely to disagree with the elite’s new position, and those from the opposite partisan team, might punish the elite the most 
for repositioning and reward them the least when a justification is offered (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Lodge and 
Taber 2006). We provide analyses on this front in Online Appendix B. Repositioning appears to have hurt evaluations to an 
equal degree across issue and partisan lines and perhaps helped the most among those that agreed with the Candidates final 
position in Study 1 and among non co-partisans in Study 2.  
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limiting the potential proximity-related costs of repositioning. We investigate this possibility in Figure 
2 where we provide mean issue attitude reports by condition and specifically according to the randomly 
assigned nature of the candidate’s position change (i.e. from Support to Oppose or vice versa). In 
Figure 2 we use respondents in the Consistent Candidate condition as a comparative baseline for 
benchmarking the potential persuasive effects of the justification as we do not have a pure control in 
the sample. In Figure 2 we also break down results by respondent ideology to gain further clarity on the 
potential persuasive role of the justifications. It is one thing, for instance, if individuals shift their 
opinions toward the elite’s position when the policy switch coincides with the individual’s 
predispositions (i.e. when there is little friction preventing the change); it is quite another if the inverse 
also occurs (i.e. moving liberals in a conservative direction and vice versa). If elites can only budge 
those that are predisposed to agree with them, for instance, then this may limit the contexts in which 
elites can successfully use a justification to escape blame for repositioning. And, indeed, existing work 
on motivated reasoning suggests that respondents should be more willing to resist and reject incoming 
messages inconsistent with their predispositions, potentially adopting more extreme attitudes in the 
opposite direction as a result, e.g. a backlash effect (Lodge and Taber 2006; Redlawsk 2002).12  
[Insert Figure 2] 
 We see some limited evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 in Figure 2. We begin with the 
Societal Fairness justification where, consistent with expectations, attitudes are more positive in the 
Oppose to Support condition than in the Consistent comparison group by approximately 0.48 [0.05, 
0.91] scale points. An examination of the ideology subgraphs demonstrates that it was primarily 
                                                          
12 Respondent ideology is measured on the post-test. A cleaner test of this relationship would be to use a pre-test measure to 
prevent the possibility of treatment contamination. Thus, some caution must be used when interpreting the sub-group 
analyses in Figure 2 although we can note that ideology does not substantially vary across conditions and we do not have a 
priori reasons to expect the treatment to influence respondent ideology.  
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liberals driving the aggregate change just mentioned with moderates contributing to the aggregate shift 
to a smaller degree. Conservatives in this condition, on the other hand, were apparently unmoved 
relative to the Consistent benchmark. On the other hand, there is no evidence of an aggregate shift in 
opinion in the Support to Oppose version of this treatment (difference: -0.04 [-.45, 0.37]). While both 
liberals and moderates show attitudes more oppositional to the Dream Act than their peers in the 
consistent condition, neither change is substantive. Thus, Figure 2 provides at best circumscribed 
evidence in favor of H3 when it comes to this justification.  
 The evidence in favor of persuasion is even weaker in the Comparison of Ends treatment. In the 
aggregate there is no evidence of attitudes shifting toward the candidate’s new position.13  An 
examination of the ideological subgroups shows some more circumscribed evidence of attitude shifts 
although not always in the direction favored by the candidate. For instance, liberals evidence more 
positive attitudes toward the Dream Act in both position history treatments when the Comparison of 
Ends justification was offered, although not significantly so; the respective differences from the 
Consistent Condition are 0.30 [-0.42, 1.01] for the Support to Oppose and 0.48 [-0.29, 1.25] for the 
Oppose to Support conditions. Likewise, Conservatives exhibit greater opposition in both of these 
conditions, although again neither difference from conservatives in the consistent condition would be 
statistically significant (Support to Oppose: -0.26 [-0.92, 0.40]; Oppose to Support: -0.44 [-1.12, 0.24]). 
Thus, one reason for the aggregate stability is the diverging opinions of liberals and conservatives when 
presented with this justification. One potential explanation for these patterns stems from the nature of 
the justification in question. As Table 1 shows, in this justification the Candidate provides a reason to 
be in favor of the Dream Act and a reason to be against it while signaling which one the candidate 
                                                          
13 The difference between these conditions and those in the Consistent Candidate A condition is -0.04 [-0.44, 0.37 ] for 
Support to Oppose and 0.03 [-0.38, 0.44] for Oppose to Support.  
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found persuasive. What may have occurred is that liberals/conservatives used the consideration that 
coincided with their predispositions to effectively counter-argue the elite’s message leading to backlash 
effects.    
 Figure 2 thus provides some partial, but limited, support for H3. Offering a justification can, in 
some cases, shift opinions toward the position of the elite. Figure 2 also supports the view that the 
predispositions of the audience will interact with these efforts, with attitude shifts most likely when 
there is no conflict between the elite’s new position and audience predispositions and the potential for 
backlash otherwise.  
Explaining Explanations: Motive Attributions 
 Persuasion is one reason why providing a justification may limit the costs of repositioning, 
albeit one that only found modest support in the preceding analyses. The basic results of Study 2 
suggest something else may also contribute to the effectiveness of justifications; after all, no specific 
policy position was mentioned in this study.14 In H4 we suggested an alternative possibility—that 
justifications would lead respondents to believe the change was motivated by positively valenced 
motives, specifically representation and policy motives.15 We investigate this possibility in Figure 3 
where we plot the average importance given to each of our motive dimensions across the two studies 
by experimental condition. The top half of Figure 3 provides results from Study 1 and shows the mean 
importance given Political (left hand subgraph) and Representation (right-hand subgraph) motives by 
treatment condition (y-axis). The bottom half of Figure 3, meanwhile, covers results from Study 2 and 
                                                          
14 It is possible that respondents were using the partisanship of the Representative to make inferences regarding whether 
they were losing or gaining proximity from the change in question. However, persuasion should nevertheless have been 
more difficult given that no specific position was mentioned. Moreover, the relatively low salience of patent reform and, 
thus of the parties’ positions on the issue, may further augur against the persuasion explanation.  
15 As we show in the Supplementary Materials, these two motive dimensions are positively related to the respondent’s 
evaluations toward the vignette elite in both studies, while the political motives dimension is unrelated to the evaluation 
dimension in Study 1 (as in Doherty 2015) and negatively so in Study 2; see Tables OB9-10. 
18 
 
shows the mean importance given to each type of motive (y-axis) separately for the two experimental 
conditions that received a justification.   
[Insert Figure 3] 
Study 1 provides the most comprehensive data for investigating Hypothesis 4. Notably, we find 
scant evidence in support of H4 in Figure 3. The positively valenced Representation Motives were not 
judged to be significantly more important in explaining the Candidate’s final position in the Societal 
Fairness (difference: 0.01 [-0.17, 0.18]) or Comparison of Ends (-0.07 [-0.24, 0.11]) conditions than in 
the No Justification counterfactual.16 On the other hand, respondents in these two conditions do place 
greater importance on the Candidate’s Political motives than those in the No Justification 
counterfactual (Societal Fairness: 0.17 [-0.01, 0.35]; Comparison of Ends: 0.22 [0.04, 0.39]). These 
results are inconsistent with H4. 
The results from Study 2, meanwhile, also do not provide strong evidence in favor of H4. One 
potential comparison of interest in this study is the relative importance given to the motives, i.e. 
whether respondents placed greater emphasis on either of the two positively valenced motive 
dimensions (policy and representation) than on political motives in explaining the elite’s change of 
position. While respondents in the Personal Fairness condition do place greater emphasis on the policy 
motives of the representative (difference: 0.26 [0.05, 0.47]), respondents in the New Information 
condition indicated that these motives were less important than political motives in explaining the 
representative’s change of position (difference: -0.26 [-0.42, -0.08]). The other two comparisons were 
                                                          
16 A one-way ANOVA of this outcome variable yields an F-statistic of 1.09 (p = 0.35).  
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both insignificant statistically and substantively. On the whole, then, Figure 3 provides little support for 
the claim that justification provision mitigates costs by shaping motive attributions in the aggregate.17    
Concluding Discussion 
Repositioning is an important component of democratic politics. However, previous studies of 
its potential electoral consequences have not explored a key element of the political environment 
surrounding the publication of such switches: efforts by elites to justify their position change. The key 
conclusion of this study is that this is an important omission. Across two experiments conducted with 
different samples, at different times, and with different procedures, we show that justifications can 
mitigate some, if not all, of the evaluative costs of repositioning. We believe that focusing on the role 
of elite communications in this context not only helps us understand the potential reaction of the mass 
public to particular instances of repositioning, but also enables us to understand the fairly frequent 
policy switching of elites (Karol 2009). Elite actors, our study suggests, may reposition to a greater 
degree than one would expect because they believe that they possess a reasonable explanation for doing 
so. As our experimental results demonstrate, this belief may not be unreasonable. In the remainder of 
this article, we will discuss potential questions regarding study design and generalizability as well as 
the study’s broader implications.  
 One question that may arise is whether the results obtained here are limited to the issues used in 
the experiments. We suspect they are not. Some prior work suggests that repositioning may elicit 
                                                          
17 In the theory section we intimated that account satisfaction should moderate these relationships, e.g. we would expect to 
see persuasion and positive motive attributions among those that accepted the account but not among those that rejected the 
justification. We assessed satisfaction on the post-test which makes a clean analysis of this possibility difficult at best given 
that individuals may have many reasons to report satisfaction with the justifications not least of which is the possibility that 
they are rationalizing from positive evaluations of the elite to satisfaction rather than vice versa. In the Online Appendix we 
report results wherein we condition on post-test account satisfaction—both in its ‘raw’ form and in analyses which use a 
version pre-processed via a coarsened exact matching process (Blackwell et al. 2009). The results reported there are 
consistent with expectations (e.g. more persuasion and more positive motive attributions alongside higher levels of account 
satisfaction). However, given the very real methodological drawbacks of using a post-test (matched or unmatched) 
satisfaction measure, we leave a fuller explication of those results to the Online Appendix.  
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different responses depending on whether the issue is economic rather than moral (Tavits 2007), easy 
rather than hard (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller n.d.), and across levels of issue salience (Tomz and 
Van Houweling 2012a). Immigration reform and patent reform appear to vary along these dimensions, 
with immigration reform being an issue higher in salience and perhaps more likely to elicit moral 
consideration than the more technical (i.e. hard), remote, and ‘pragmatic’ issue of patent reform. 
Notably we saw similar patterns across both types of issues. While other elements of the issue, such as 
issue ownership (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010), could also conceivably matter, and deserve 
further attention, the existing evidence suggests that the results from Studies 1 and 2 are not limited to 
the present set of issues.  
 Future work may profitably focus on other elements of the communicative environment in 
which elite justifications are offered. Acceptance of elite justifications should be a function of audience 
characteristics, source factors such as perceived credibility, and the competitive environment in much 
the same way that these factors work in other persuasive contexts (e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007; 
Druckman 2001). Not all speakers will be able to use justifications and their effectiveness is likely to 
vary across contexts. Perhaps of most interest is the role of competing messages concerning the 
cause(s) of a policy switch. Participants in our study heard only the most favorable recording of the 
decision’s cause, i.e. the elite’s, but instances of repositioning are also likely to feature charges from 
political competitors that the elite was motivated by strategic goals (see, for instance: Adams and 
Somer-Topcu 2009, 688). The outcome of such competitive framing events will likely depend on the 
source of the message opposing the elite’s explanation and its ‘strength’. Ratings of account 
satisfaction in Study 2 were significantly higher when the elite was a co-partisan (as we discuss in 
Online Appendix B), which is consistent with prior work on partisan motivated reasoning (Leeper and 
Slothuus 2014). It thus seems likely that a competing negative message about the causes of a particular 
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policy switch will be disregarded by co-partisans. In political contexts wherein the repositioning elite is 
faced with a clear majority of co-partisans, this competition between messages is perhaps unlikely to 
hurt elite evaluations. On the other hand, charges of flip-flopping may come from co-partisan sources 
as well. In such cases, it may be that the relative strength of the competing arguments matters most; if 
the two arguments are roughly matched, then they should balance each out (Chong and Druckman 
2007). However, this is a speculative point in this particular context given the lack of research on how 
justifications and strategic causal frames interact to influence elite evaluations.  
Finally, we have suggested that elite justifications may work because they affect the policy 
preferences of audience members and/or because of their effects on the motive attributions of these 
individuals. In the aggregate our empirical results were mixed at best in explaining the effectiveness of 
the justifications, although our analyses using a post-test measure of account satisfaction provided 
stronger support for our expectations (see fn. 16). Future work may profitably advance our 
understanding the role of elite justifications by mimicking recent work on competitive framing and 
randomly providing respondents with either a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ justification (as in Chong & 
Druckman, 2007); doing so would provide a more causally compelling investigating of the potential 
mechanisms at play. In addition, future work may profit by exploring alternative mechanisms 
unexplored here. Repositioning elites, for instance, may elicit affective responses such as anger that 
may drive negative evaluation and which may be soothed, or not, by satisfactory explanations for the 
change in question. Alternatively, Tyler and Blader (2003) suggest that fair procedures may generate 
positive outcomes such as group identification and cooperation because they elicit feelings of pride and 
respect. Providing a justification may be a signal of respect from elite to constituent and work via this 
pathway. Understanding the potential mechanisms at work is crucial for understanding when elites be 
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given the most, versus the last, leeway when acting publicly and hence their subsequent legislative 
behavior.  
 We conclude by discussing the broader implications of this study. The charge of ‘flip-flopping’ 
is often used in such contexts as a tactic for damaging opponents while interest groups place faith in the 
effectiveness of this charge in motivating elected officials to sign various campaign pledges (Tomz and 
Van Houweling 2012b). However, this study suggests that policy switches may be less consequential 
for evaluations than previously thought (see also: Doherty et al. n.d.; Vavreck 2015). Our results 
suggest that repositioning elites will not be greatly harmed by a policy switch, should it become public 
knowledge, provided that they can give a satisfactory explanation for their change. This last clause, of 
course, is the heart of the matter as it suggests further conditioning factors affecting repositioning’s 
effects. Elites offering a generally dissatisfactory explanation, such as an excuse or denial (McGraw 
1991), are unlikely to receive the benefits described here. Nor are representatives who make a move 
that goes against the issue preferences of the majority of their constituents or officials who face a 
constituency stacked with partisans from the other side, although in the present gerrymandered 
landscape of American politics this may not be that great a worry for legislators. This study thus 
suggest a somewhat complicated calculus facing elected officials who wish to make a switch, but one 
that does not foreclose the possibility of changing positions and saving one’s electoral neck at the same 
time. This in turn has potential legislative consequences; insofar as representatives are hesitant to 
compromise on legislation because it would entail a clash with their prior statements or actions, then 
this study suggests that there may be more room for electorally-safe compromise than the conventional 
wisdom might allow.  
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Table 1: Experimental Vignettes with Treatments in Brackets  
Study 1 Study 2 
We would like your views about a candidate, 
Candidate A, whose name will remain confidential. 
 
Non-partisan groups often survey candidates about 
the issue of immigration reform and the Dream Act 
in particular. When asked about the Dream Act two 
years ago, Candidate A indicated [support 
for/opposition to] passing the Dream Act. Candidate 
A's position was [the same/different] when recently 
surveyed; that is, Candidate A [continues to 
support/oppose] [now opposes/supports] passage of 
the Dream Act.  
 
[If in Justification Condition: 
[Justification: Support/Oppose, Societal Fairness:  
When asked about the change in position, Candidate 
A wrote: "I've changed my position because I have 
come to believe that the current system is unfair to 
individuals in other countries who wish to legally 
migrate to the United States. I now believe that 
passing the Dream Act would ultimately create a 
less fair immigration system.] 
 
[Justification: Oppose/Support, Societal Fairness  
When asked about the change in position, Candidate 
A wrote: "I've changed my position because I have 
come to believe that the current system is unfair to 
individuals taken to this country as children. I now 
believe that passing the Dream Act would 
ultimately create a more fair immigration system."] 
  
[Justification: Support/Oppose, Comparison  
When asked about the change in position, Candidate 
A wrote: "I have changed my position because, 
although the Dream Act would enable more 
children of immigrants to gain a college education, 
it would also impose a significant strain on 
government services."] 
 
[Justification: Oppose/Support, Comparison: 
When asked about the change in position, Candidate 
A wrote: "I have changed my position because, 
although the Dream Act would impose a significant 
strain on government services, it will also enable 
more children of immigrants to gain a college 
education." ] 
 
We would like your views about a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Representative A, whose name will remain 
confidential.  
 
Representative A is a member of the [Democratic/Republican] 
Party and has been in Congress for three terms having previously 
served as a state representative for twelve years. While a member 
of the state legislature, Representative A served on the 
Appropriations Committee, which oversees budgeting, as well as 
the Energy Committee, where Representative A was Chair of the 
committee. After twelve years of service, Representative A was 
elected to serve in Congress. Since entering Congress, 
Representative A has continued to work on issues concerning the 
nation’s energy infrastructure by serving on the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee.  
 
Each term The Americans for Democratic Action provides a score 
concerning the voting record of legislators. The score ranges from 
0-100 with higher scores indicating a more liberal voting record. 
In its most recent publication, Representative A received a score 
of [80/20] from the ADA.  
 
[If in a Treatment Condition:  Recently, Representative A has 
been charged with flip-flopping on how they said they would vote 
on the TROL Act, a bill that would reform the patent system. 
[Consistent Condition: However, a PolitiFact investigation found 
that this charge had no merit. The investigation described 
Representative A as voting in full consistency with their promises 
on this issue.] [Repositioned Conditions:  A PolitiFact 
investigation found that this charge had merit. The investigation 
reported that Representative A had indeed voted differently than 
they said they would on the issue.] 
 
[If in Fairness Conditions: When asked about the report, 
Representative A said: “It’s true that I changed my mind on this 
issue. However, as we debated the bill it grew clear that what was 
at stake was simple fairness and I had to change positions unless I 
betrayed one of my core beliefs.”] 
 
[If in New Information Conditions: When asked about the report, 
Representative A said: “It’s true that I changed my mind on this 
issue. However, I believe it is important to not ignore new 
information when it arises and as more details emerged about the 
bill it became clear that I needed to change course.”] 
 
Representative A continues to return to their home district at least 
once a month to meet with constituents and supporters. 
Representative A spent seven years practicing law before running 
for office. Representative A has been married for thirty years and 
has three children – two sons (Jason and Eric) and one daughter 
(Jessica). 
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Figure 1: Mean Evaluations by Experimental Condition, Experiments 1 & 2 
 
Notes: The top graphs show the group means on the elite evaluation measure (M = 0, SD =1) across 
experimental condition along with 95% and 90% confidence intervals. The middle graphs show the 
difference in evaluations with the Consistent and Baseline elites as the baseline, while the bottom 
graphs also focus on difference in evaluations but this time with the Repositioned (No Justification) 
condition as the baseline.   
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Figure 2: Justifications and Persuasion 
 
Notes: Markers provide the respondent’s post-test attitude report in Study 1, scaled so that 0 = “Neither 
Support Nor Oppose,” positive scores indicate support, and negative scores opposition to the Dream 
Act (range: -3 to +3). Separate graphs are provided for Liberals, Moderates, and Conservatives.  
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Figure 3: Motive Attribution by Condition 
 
 
 
Notes: Markers provide the mean importance given to the various motive attributions for why the 
Candidate took their final position and why the Representative changed positions, each scaled so that 
M = 0, SD  = 1. The top graph provides separate graphs for the two motive variables with the y-axis 
covering the four experimental condition groups, while the bottom graph provides separate graphs for 
the two treatment groups of relevance and the y-axis provides the three outcome variables. 
 
 
 
 
